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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3970 
___________ 
 
BAOJIN LIU, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
        Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-782-488) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 7, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 8, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Baojin Liu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying a motion to reopen.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 Liu entered the United States in 2007 without inspection.  He appeared before an 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in 2008 and conceded removability, but sought asylum and 
related relief on the ground that he fled China due to its family planning policy.  The IJ 
denied Liu’s applications.  ( A.R. at 206.)  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and 
dismissed Liu’s appeal on September 16, 2009.  (Id. at 171-74.) 
Over two years later, Liu moved to reopen his removal proceedings based on his 
practice of Falun Gong and changed country conditions.  (Id. at 16.)  He claimed that he 
started practicing Falun Gong in January 2011, and learned that Falun Gong practitioners 
were “persecuted by the Chinese government.”  (Id. at 21.)  According to Liu, someone 
took his picture while he was participating in parades supporting Falun Gong, and those 
pictures were provided to the Chinese government.  (Id. 21-23.)  The “village cadres” 
then visited Liu’s wife in China and told her that he would be “severely punished” by the 
Chinese government due to his Falun Gong activities.  (Id. at 23.)  In support of his 
motion to reopen, Liu submitted documentary evidence, including pictures, a notice from 
the “Village Committee” in China, and an affidavit from his wife.  (Id. at 67-97.) 
The BIA denied the motion to reopen, reasoning that Liu’s documentary evidence 
was not properly authenticated or supported by any persuasive evidence, and was of 
“essentially unknown reliability.”  (Id. at 8.)  The BIA further reasoned that the State 
Department’s report on China does not indicate that Chinese citizens who practice or 
3 
 
support Falun Gong suffer mistreatment amounting to persecution in China.  (Id. at 9.)  
The BIA concluded that Liu’s motion was filed well outside of the ninety days provided 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), and that he did not prove by sufficient evidence that 
there was a change in circumstances or country conditions arising in China so as to create 
an exception to that time limit, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  (Id.)  Liu now seeks 
review of the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA’s denial of 
Liu’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard to our review.  See 
Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2007).  The BIA’s decision is entitled to 
“broad deference,” Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted), and “will not be disturbed unless [it is] found to be 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citation omitted). 
With limited exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of 
the date of entry of a final administrative order.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  It is 
undisputed that Liu’s motion to reopen was filed over two years after the BIA’s final 
administrative order dismissing his appeal.  Therefore, to circumvent that time limit, Liu 
had to provide material evidence of changed conditions in China that could not have been 
discovered or presented during the previous proceeding.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
Liu argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen 
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because he provided “sufficiently reliable evidence” to support it.  (Pet’r. Br. at 11.)  
However, we agree with the BIA that the unauthenticated documentary evidence Liu 
submitted was of dubious value.  Further, the BIA’s conclusion, based on the State 
Department’s report, that practitioners of Falun Gong do not suffer mistreatment 
amounting to persecution in China, was well-founded.  There was no material change in 
China’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners after Liu’s 2008 hearing.  The only change 
in circumstance Liu could demonstrate was personal, given that his participation in Falun 
Gong began in 2011.  That does not suffice to excuse the time limitation on his motion to 
reopen.  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 149-51 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because Liu did not 
meet the standard set forth in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 
denying his motion to reopen as untimely. 
III. 
Because the denial of Liu’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion, see 
Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 153, we will deny his petition for review.
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1
 We need not reach the Respondent’s alternative argument that Liu failed to set 
forth a prima facie relief or protection claim.  (Resp’t Br. at 14.) 
